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The Legislature's Response To
Serrano v. Priest

A. ALAN POST*
RICHARD W. BRANDSMA**

No recent court case has possessed more potential for significant impact upon the state's method of financing public schools
than the Supreme Court of California'sdecision in Serrano v. Priest.
By holding that the quality of public school education cannot be
conditioned upon a school district'swealth, the court has caused the
California Legislature to re-evaluate not only the school finance
system, but the state's property tax structure. While many of the
issues raised by the Serrano decision have been commented upon,
the economic factors upon which a legally and politically acceptable financing alternative must be based have gone largely unnoticed. In this article, A. Alan Post and Richard Brandsma have
addressed themselves to the practicaleconomics involved in providing a solution to the state's public school finance dilemma. The authors examine the school finance problem in the context of the
court's guidelines, analyze the major policy alternatives available
to the Legislature, discuss the necessary considerationsfor both an
alternative school finance system and for alternative school revenue
sources, and present observations concerning the practical considerations inherent in establishing alternative state revenue sources.
* A.B. Occidental College 1938, M.A. Princeton University 1940, LL.D. Golden
Gate University. Legislative Analyst, State of California since 1949.
** A.B. Hope College 1963, M.A. University of Wyoming 1964, M.A. University of California 1969. Principal Program Analyst, Office of the Legislative
Analyst, State of California.
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The authors conclude among other things, that S.B. 90, passed on
the final day of the 1972 Legislature, will not result in compliance
with Serrano.
The Supreme Court of California in Serrano v. Priest1 foreshadowed
the invalidation of California's method of public school financing. 2
The court, in effect, offered a clear standard against which the California Legislature may redesign the support system to make it both more

effective and more equitable. 3 From the public policy standpoint, the
decision offers opportunities to the Legislature for combining property
tax relief with school finance reform. Because of the procedural posture of the case,4 however, the supreme court was neither required nor
inclined to indicate the length of time in which the state would be allowed to reconstitute the school financing system nor to establish precisely how much, if any, deviation from the standard announced in the
opinion would be permitted.
There are a number of methods by which the standard of Serrano
can be met, and since each of these affects school districts in differing
ways (because of variations in school district wealth and school cost
characteristics), the approach which is selected will undoubtedly have
to represent a political compromise. This political compromise will unquestionably become more complex and difficult because it is quite
probable that the school financing issue will be joined with the issue
of property tax relief generally, and this, in turn, will bring to issue the
problem of selection of replacement revenue.
1. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
2. While the Serrano decision has been reported as having declared that California's method of financing public school education is unconstitutional, procedurally
speaking, the decision did not go that far. The case arose initially when public
school children and their parents commenced a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of the public school financing system. All defendants filed general demurrers to the complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrers with leave to amend,
and when the plaintiffs failed to do so, the court granted defendants' motion for dismissal. Although the supreme court prepared a lengthy decision containing specific
discussions for guidelines for public school financing, the court procedurally only reversed the trial court's dismissal order and remanded the case with directions to overrule the demurrers and allow the defendants a reasonable time to answer. Thus, the
case is currently back in the Los Angeles Superior Court where it is undergoing trial.
3. We are called upon to determine whether the California public school
financing system, with its substantial dependence on local property taxes and
resultant wide disparities in school revenue, violates the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have determined that this funding
scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality
of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors.
Recognizing as we must that the right to an education in our public schools is
a fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned on wealth, we can discern
no compelling state purpose necessitating the present method of financing.
We have concluded, therefore, that such a system cannot withstand constitutional challenge and must fall before the equal protection clause.
5 Cal. 3d at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
4. See note 2 supra.
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The purpose of this article will be to outline the nature of the school
finance problem considered in Serrano, to translate this into major
policy alternatives available to the Legislature in seeking to resolve the
issue, and to suggest recommendations and observations which the Of-

fice of Legislative Analyst in fulfilling its role as fiscal advisor will offer
the Legislature.
California'sSchool Finance System
The major component of the present state school system is the
foundation program which is designed to guarantee a prescribed level
of financial support from state and local funds for all public school
pupils. It is important to note that the foundation program does not
represent the total amount spent by school districts for each pupil but
merely guarantees a minimal level of support. 5 The foundation program support levels prescribed under current law are $355 per elementary pupil,6 $488 per high school pupil, 7 and $643 per community
college pupil.8 The foundation program consists of three elements:
basic aid, district aid, and equalization aid. Each of these will be
discussed separately.
(1) Basic Aid. Article IX, Section 6, of the California Constitution requires that" . . . there shall be apportioned to each school district in each fiscal year not less than one hundred and twenty dollars
($120) per pupil in average daily attendance in the district." This
amount was increased to $125 by statutory authorization.9 Basic aid
is paid from state funds to all districts of the state regardless of their
property wealth as measured by assessed valuation.
(2) District Aid. Each school district in the state is required to
contribute locally-raised funds to the foundation program. The
amount of such contributions is determined by applying a specified
tax rate to each district's assessed valuation of property. 10
The tax rates used for this purpose are:'1
5. In practice, state school aid is distributed not on the basis of pupil enrollment
but on the basis of average daily attendance (ADA). ADA is computed by adding to.
gether the number of students present on each school day and dividing by the number
of days school was taught. When we refer to figures on a per pupil basis we mean
per unit of ADA.
6. CAL. EDUC. CODE §17656. The foundation program support levels contained
in the code section cited in this note and note 7 have been changed by S.B. 90, CAL.
STATS. 1972, c. 1406.
7. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§17665, 17665.5.
8. CAL. EDUC. CODE §17666.2.
9. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§17751, 17801, 17851.
10. CAL. EDUC. CODE §17906.2. For discussion of equalization aid, see text
accompanying notes 12-13 infra.

11. CAL. EDUC. CODE §17906.2. The elementary and high school tax rates have
been changed by S.B. 90, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1406.
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$1.00 per $100 of assessed
valuation
High School
$0.80 per $100 of assessed
valuation
Community College
$0.25 per $100 of assessed
valuation
It is important to note that district aid is a measure of the relative
financial ability of a school district and does not necessarily represent
the total amount of local support to be raised by school district taxes.
Thus, districts with high rates of assessed valuation per pupil" contribute more local support to the foundation program than do districts
with low rates of assessed valuation per pupil.
(3) Equalization Aid. The third component of the foundation
program is state equalization aid. The amount of state equalization
aid paid to a school district is determined by subtracting basic aid plus
district aid from the guaranteed total foundation program. Districts in
which the combined total of basic aid and district aid exceeds the
guaranteed foundation program level do not receive state equalization
aid. Districts in which the combined total of basic aid and district
aid is less than the guaranteed foundation program receive state equalization aid in proportion to their assessed valuation per pupil.
Table 1 illustrates the amount of state aid that two elementary districts with different assessed valuations per pupil (one with an assessed valuation per pupil of $15,000 and the other with an assessed
valuation per pupil of $23,000) would receive under the present elementary foundation program. The table shows that District A with an
assessed valuation per pupil of $15,000 would receive a total of $205
in aid from the state ($125 basic aid and $80 equalization aid); District B, the wealthier district, on the other hand, with assessed valuation of $23,000 per pupil, would receive only $125 in aid from the
state (basic aid).
Table 1
Computationof FoundationProgramSupport for
Two Elementary Districts with Different
Assessed Valuations per Pupil'3
District A
District B
Assessed Valuation per Pupil
$15,000
$23,000
Guaranteed Regular Elementary
$355
$355
Foundation Program (per pupil)
Comprised of:
Elementary

12. Assessed valuation per pupil is a generally accepted measure of a school district's local wealth. It is derived by dividing the assessed valuation of the property in
the district by the number of pupils.
13. Computation by the authors based upon: OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE, PART IMl, THE FOUNDATION PROGRAM, Dec. 11, 1970.
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1. State Basic Aid
2. District Aid ($1.00 computational tax times the
district's assessed valuation per pupil)
3. State Equalization Aid
Total State Support per Pupil

$125
$150

$125
$230

$ 80
$205

0
$125

In addition to the foundation program, the state provides supplemental support for qualifying low wealth districts,14 and categorical aid
for special programs such as compensatory education. 15
Any district, of course, may raise additional revenue for education
by additional property tax levies upon its own wealth.1 6
Currently wide disparities exist among California school districts in
their ability to support educational programs as measured by assessed
valuation per pupil. Table 2 illustrates the extent of these tax base
differences among various school districts.
Table 2
7

Assessed Valuationper Pupil-1970-71'
District Level
Low
Median
High
Elementary
$ 75
$20,083
$1,053,436
High School
8,836
42,777
355,513
As one might expect, these wide variations in district tax bases result
in significant variations in the school tax rates which property owners
are required to bear. Table 3 illustrates this range of tax rates and
shows, for example, that the unified districts with the highest taxes
have rates over seven times those of the lowest district.
Table 3
Range of Tax Rates for Public School Districts's
1970-71
District Level
Low
Median
High
Elementary
$0.39
$2.35
$5.16
High School
0.83
2.15
3.14
Unified
1.08
4.50
7.83
14. CAL. EDuc.

CODE

§§17920-17928, 20815.

15. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§18101.6-18104.
16. See CAL. EDuc.CODE §§20701-20901.

17. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, REPORT TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET
COMMITrEE, ANALYSIS OF TnE BUDGET BILL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR FISCAL
YEAR JULY 1, 1972 TO JUNE 30, 1973, at 786.
18. Id.

1973 / The Legislature's Response to Serrano v. Priest
The various levels of taxable wealth and district tax rates working
together result in a wide range of per pupil expenditures as shown in
Table 4.
Table 4
Range of School DistrictCurrent Expenditures per Pupil'9
1970-71
District Level
Low
High
Elementary
$420
$3,447
High School
766
1,879
Unified
597
2,448
In some cases, districts with low expenditure levels have correspondingly low tax rates. More often, however, the opposite is true;
districts with unusually low expenditures are forced to have unusually
high tax rates because of their limited tax bases. Table 5 demonstrates how this disparate situation occurs in school districts located

within the same county.
Table 5
Comparisonof School DistrictTax Rates and Expenditure
20
Levels in Selected Counties-1970-71
Assessed Value
Number
per
of Pupils
Pupi1

County
Alameda
Emery Unified
593
Newark Unified
9,673
Fresno
Coalinga Unified
2,408
Clovis Unified
8,809
Kern
Rio Bravo Elementary 130
Lamont Elementary
1,825
Los Angeles
Beverly Hills Unified 5,791
Baldwin Park
Unified
12,960

Expenditure
District
per

Tax Rate

Pupil

$92,1 51
6,0 56

$2.66
5.69

$2,448
719

32,4 83
6,4 69

3.38
5.40

1,151
662

88,2 88
6,5 97

1.26
3.05

1,402
708

52,4 07

3.16

1,516

4,0!90

5.74

Certain features of the state school support system are designed to
adjust these disparities (such as the district aid component of the
foundation program, which modifies state support to some degree in
relation to district assessed valuation). These adjustment features
19. Id.

20. Id. at 787.
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have not, however, been sufficient to equalize the ability of school districts to finance equal per pupil expenditures from the same tax effort.
Table 5 demonstrates this fact.
Serrano v. Priestand Subsequent Legal Action in Other States
The Supreme Court of California declared in Serrano v. Priest that
reliance on local property tax bases made "a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors."' 21 The court further
stated that California's funding system violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution because the right to public education "is a fundamental interest which
cannot be conditioned on wealth. 22 Subsequent court decisions in
other states have reiterated the findings of the court in Serrano.23 In
fact, suits relying on Serrano's reasoning or related actions are now
pending or have been decided in at least 20 jurisdictions, 24 and the
United States Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction of a
Texas case, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District,25
during its present session.
SerranoPrinciplesand Alternative School FinanceSystems
Although the Supreme Court of California has indicated that if the
facts alleged in Serrano are proven true, the present school financing
system would be unconstitutional, the court did not propose any remedies or guidelines as to what approach need be taken to correct the alleged inequities in the present system. 26 The decisions following Serrano in other jurisdictions have also failed to specify any alternative
7
systems.
With no specific alternatives being dictated by the California Supreme Court, it would appear that the Legislature has been allowed
considerable flexibility in developing an alternative system. The only
major test such a new system must meet is that the financing of educa21. 5 Cal. 3d at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
22. Id.

23. See, e.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971). See
also Federation of Tax Administrators, School Finance, The Property Tax and the
Courts, March 15, 1972, at 4-7 (unpublished paper on file at the Office of the Legislative Analyst, Sacramento, California).
24. Federation of Tax Administrators, supra note 23, at 8.
25. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 92 S. Ct. 2413
(1972).
26. 5 Cal. 3d at 615, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
27. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Rodriguez v.
San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972); Sweet.
water County Planning Committee v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1972); Robinson v.
Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
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tion not be a function of the wealth of individual school districts. The
following general alternatives would thus appear to meet the principle
of fiscal neutrality2 s established by Serrano and other decisions: (1)
equalization of school district expenditures for basic educational programs, or (2) equalization of the capacity of school districts to raise
revenue. These alternatives and certain options contained within each
alternative will be discussed next.
A.

Equalization of Expenditures

None of the court decisions on school finance require a funding system which would provide equal expenditure for every pupil. However,
a school finance system which equalizes expenditures for basic educational programs could meet the Serrano ruling that educational expenditures may not be a function of district wealth.
Under a system designed to equalize expenditures, all school districts could be provided the same expenditure per pupil for a basic
educational program. Beyond this basic level of support, categorical
aid programs could be established to meet special needs. Such a system could be financed in a number of ways ranging from full state
funding to local funding from an equalized revenue source.
A major problem which confronts any proposal to equalize school
district expenditures is the necessity of identifying an adequate level of
support. It is a common hypothesis that higher expenditures result in
more effective educational programs. However, a number of studies
do not support such a contention, particularly as they relate to basic
educational programs. 2 9 In view of the wide disparities in expenditures per pupil and a lack of data which identifies an optimum expenditure level in terms of marginal increases in pupil achievement, it
is difficult to determine whether the expenditure levels of low spending
districts should be increased or whether the expenditure levels of high
spending districts should be reduced. Substantial additional costs
could result from increasing the expenditure levels of low spending districts. On the other hand, numerous political, educational, and economic problems could result from reducing the expenditure levels of
28. The court's finding that a child's education may not be a function of the

wealth of his parents and neighbors has been termed the "principle of fiscal neutrality." Testimony of John B. Coons, Professor of Law, University of California,
Berkeley, before the United States Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational
Opportunity, Sept. 28, 1971 (on file at the Office of the Legislative Analyst, Sacramento, California).
29. See, e.g., COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. OFFICE OF
EDUCATION (1966).
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high spending districts. For example, about 70 percent of school dis-

trict expenditures are for salaries.80 If high spending districts were
required to reduce expenditures, it would be necessary for them to reduce teacher salaries, eliminate programs, or reduce the number of
teachers employed.
B.

Equalization of the Capacity of School Districts to Raise
Revenues

A school finance system which equalizes the ability of districts to
raise school revenues, i.e., provides districts with equal school expenditures for equal tax efforts, would appear to meet the fiscal neutrality

principle of Serrano since it would eliminate the disparities in district
tax rates and per pupil expenditures. 3 1 That is to say, less wealthy

school districts (districts with lower assessed valuation per pupil)
would not have to raise their tax rates to a level above those of wealthier districts in order to achieve equality of per pupil expenditures.
There are at least two methods of achieving equalized revenue raising
capacity: (1) power-equalizing and (2) tax base equalizing.
1.

Power-Equalizing
One way to equalize the ability of school districts to fund an educa-

tional program would be to enact a guaranteed revenue-tax schedule
which would provide each district a specified amount of revenue for

each cent of property tax effort. For example, each district, regardless of wealth (as measured by the assessed valuation of its territory),
could be guaranteed an expenditure of $3 per pupil for each cent
of
2
property tax it levied. This approach is called power-equalizing.
Under a power-equalizing system, each district could determine how
much per pupil it wanted to spend. Districts which choose identical
spending levels would have identical tax rates because the tax rate
would be determined automatically by the expenditure level chosen by
30.

CALIFORNIA STAT

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS

SELECTED STATISTICS 1970-1971, at 79 (1972).

31. The court states, ". . . as a practical matter districts with small tax bases
simply cannot levy taxes at a rate sufficient to produce the revenue that more affluent
districts reap with minimal tax efforts." 5 Cal. 3d at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal.
Rptr. at 610.

The court further states,

".

.

. we reject defendant's underlying thesis

that classification by wealth is constitutional so long as the wealth is that of the
district, not the individual. We think that discrimination on the basis of district wealth
is equally invalid . . . To allot more educational dollars to the children of one district than to those of another because of the fortuitous presence of such property is
to make the quality of a child's education dependent upon the location of private commercial and industrial establishments." Id. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
613.
32. See J. COONS, ParVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970).
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the district. Assume, for example, that a basic power-equalizing
schedule were enacted which permitted districts to spend $3.00 per
pupil for each cent of property tax levied per $100 of assessed valuation. As shown in Table 6, Districts A, B, and C could all decide to
spend $1,200 per pupil. The property tax rate for each district would
then be $4.00 per $100 of assessed valuation. However, Table 6
shows that because of variations in assessed valuation, this $4.00
property tax rate would produce $800 more than the selected per pupil
expenditure of $1,200 in District A, while in District C there would
be a deficit of $800 per pupil. Thus, an additional feature of the
power-equalizing system is that excess revenue from districts with
high assessed valuation could be redistributed by the state to districts
whose assessed valuation does not produce sufficient revenue to support the selected per pupil expenditure level. In the hypothetical case
in Table 6, for example, the state would take the $800 revenue surplus
in District A and redistribute it to District C in order to satisfy District
C's revenue deficit.
Table 6
Redistributionof Funds Under GuaranteedExpenditure-Tax or
Power-EqualizingSchedule
Assessed Revenue Revenue
Per pupil District valuation from tax surplus(+)
District
expenditure* tax rate
per pupil per pupil deficit(-)
District A
$1,200
$4.00
$50,000
$2,000 -+-$800
District B
1,200
4.00
30,000
1,200
none
District C
1,200
4.00
10,000
400 -$800
: Expenditure levels are determined by districts on the basis of a power-equalizing
schedule which provides revenue of $3.00 per pupil for each cent of property tax levied.

Under the power-equalizing schedule illustrated in Table 6 a onecent tax would not raise enough revenue from the local property tax
base to provide an expenditure of $3 per pupil in districts with an assessed valuation below $30,000 per pupil. In districts with an assessed valuation greater than $30,000 per pupil, a one-cent tax would
raise more revenue than $3 per pupil and the excess revenue would be
used for redistribution to less wealthy districts.
It is difficult to estimate the cost to the state of basing the school
finance system on a power-equalizing schedule because the necessary
variables to compute such a cost are unknown. The specific cost
would be determined by the amount of expenditure authorized for a
given tax rate and the per pupil expenditure levels chosen by school
districts. However, the greater the number of dollars that districts
are allowed to spend per pupil for each cent of property tax they levy,
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the higher the potential state cost will be. This is because the number
of districts with an assessed valuation per pupil sufficient to produce
the guaranteed expenditure per pupil decreases as the level of guaranteed expenditure per pupil is increased. For example, an estimated
75 percent, or 825, of California's school districts have an assessed
valuation per pupil below $30,000. 33 If a power-equalizing schedule of
$3 per pupil for each cent of tax rate were used, these districts could
not generate the total $3 per pupil from their local property tax bases;
thus, the necessary additional revenue for these districts to spend at
the guaranteed level of $3 per pupil for each cent of tax would have to
be provided by the state.
From a budgetary standpoint, the power-equalizing model poses
problems in that the state would not know how much money it would
have available for redistribution until local school districts set their
expenditure levels.
Another problem with the power-equalizing model is the potential
effect of such a system upon the choice between education and other
public services. It is possible that if power-equalizing applied only to
education, local governments with high assessed valuations might be
inclined to give education lower priority than other services for which
they would not "lose" local revenue.
2. Equalizing School District Tax Bases by District Reorganization
An alternative to power-equalizing as a method of equalizing the
capacity of school districts to raise revenue would be to equalize school
district property tax bases by means of district reorganization. Table
7 indicates the potential impact of district reorganization on equalizing
the assessed valuation per elementary pupil. The table shows that under the present system, the assessed valuation per pupil ranges from a
high of $1,053,436 to a low of $75.34 If, for example, California
school districts were unified on a county-wide basis, the range would
be from a high of $81,229 per pupil to a low of $8,346 per pupil.";
Alternatively, if the districts were reorganized into the twelve regions
established in the state under current law for vocational education
planning, 6 the range would be from a high of $28,869 per pupil to a
low of $12,743 per pupil.37 These figures illustrate that it is possible
to reduce the differences in tax bases among school districts by means
of district reorganization.
33.
34.
35.
36.

CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS SELECTED STATISTICS, supra note 30, at 25-26.
REPORT TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COmmIITrE, supra note 17, at 796.

Id.
CAL. EDUC. CODE §6268.

37. REPORT TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMrrTEE, supra note 17, at 796.

1973 / The Legislature's Response to Serrano v. Priest
While it may be impossible to completely equalize school district
tax bases through reorganization, short of establishing one statewide
district, many discrepancies in school district wealth could be eliminated by reducing the number of districts in the state. Reorganization38
could also provide significant financial and administrative advantages
while local control over educational policies could be retained in separate sub-boards for those purposes.
Table 7
Impact of School DistrictReorganizationon Range in Assessed
Valuation per Elementary Average Daily Attendance3 9
Present
Range in
Regional
Countywide
district
assessed valuation
unification
unification
per elementary pupil organization
$28,869
$81,229
$1,053,436
High
15,368
18,155
20,083
Median
12,743
8,346
75
Low
Necessary Considerationsfor an Alternative School FinanceSystem
A.

Basic FoundationProgram

The Serrano decision may not require the Legislature to provide
school districts equal program support. However, we believe that as a
practical matter the Legislature must guarantee a level of per pupil
expenditure which is related to the fundamental mission of the school
program. Therefore, it seems logical that the state foundation program be based on education expenditures deemed critical to the basic
education of every child. Under normal conditions this would include
teacher salaries and other costs directly related to classroom instruction.
While there are problems in identifying an adequate foundation program, the Legislature has two major alternatives already available
for use in setting a basic support level. It could use either the current
statewide average cost of education, or the basic program support levels adopted by the State Board of Education. 40 The cost of the basic
foundation program could be paid from a combination of state funds
and revenue from a statewide property tax.
Districts which wanted to provide a more comprehensive program
38. Educational experts generally contend that district reorganization can reduce
administrative overhead and eliminate staffing duplications.
39. REPORT TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIvE BUDGET COMMII"EE, supra note 17, at 796.
40. See Report of the State Board of Education, School Support Committee,
Feb. 18, 1972.
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could be permitted to exceed the basic foundation program level by
41
means of a power-equalizing tax system, as previously outlined.
B.

CategoricalAid

Beyond the basic foundation program, state support could be provided on a categorical basis to fund required adjuncts to the base level
program. For example, additional state aid could be provided to districts where high concentrations of educationally disadvantaged children result in additional program costs, such as special equipment or
the addition of teachers' aides.
Categorical aid could be distributed according to a formula which
considered: (1) educational needs such as pupil achievement scores,
concentration of bilingual and bi-cultural students, concentration of
low income students; and (2) district effort to provide a comprehensive educational program such as extra tax effort, district organization,
and program quality as measured by objective criteria developed by
the Department of Education.
C. Cost Adjustments
Any Proposal for school finance reform should contain a mechanism
to adjust state support for cost increases due to inflation and changes
in real purchasing power. The existing system of state support is inflexible and unresponsive to changes in the value of the dollar and
the economy. The two principal economic trends which should be
accounted for by the system are (1) cost changes due to inflation42 and (2) changes in real purchasing power. 43 At present the
additional costs which result from inflation and the efforts of school
districts to keep the real purchasing power of teachers at parity with
that of the rest of the labor force are borne largely by the property
taxpayer. Any new school finance system should contain a mechanism
to provide the state's share of these increased school costs.
41. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
42. A significant portion of the increases in the cost of education can be attributed to inflation which has escalated dramatically since 1966. For example, the
California Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by 4.07% during 1970-71 which
was more than double the rate of increase during the early 1960's. The CPI index
measures only the growth in prices paid by the general public for goods and services.
It is not a direct reflection of the increased cost of education because most of the costs
for schools consist of services (e.g., teacher salaries) which typically increase faster
than general consumer prices.
43. During the 1960's, real purchasing power, i.e., the growth in income excluding the effects of inflation, increased at an average annual rate which, if compounded,
would be approximately 2.75 percent.
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D.

ProgramEvaluation

In providing educational funds, the Legislature would benefit from
requiring an evaluation-feedback process to determine whether funds
are being utilized effectively.
An evaluation-feedback process for educational programs requires
(1) measurable performance objectives, (2) collection of standardized
and comparable data at various program levels, (3) a plan for judging the effectiveness of individual districts, schools and/or classrooms
in meeting program objectives and (4) a method of translating evaluation results into appropriate program changes.
The implementation of this process is rare in education. In a recent
study of compensatory education programs our office found that the
evaluation and feedback processes were totally inadequate for five of
the six reviewed categorical aid programs. 44 We found that measurements of student performance were not used to improve programs,
expenditures were not directed toward increasing program effectiveness, and statewide program accountability generally fell short of legislative intentions.4 5 It is apparent that these deficiencies exist in the
regular educational programs as well as the categorical aid programs,
and any proposal for school finance reform should be designed to remedy all such deficiencies.
Revenue Sources for Alternative School Finance Systems
Having examined the major alternative school finance systems which
appear to meet the test applied in Serrano, we shall review several alternative sources of revenue for school finance. The importance of
considering revenue sources is that it seems likely that additional state
financing will be necessary regardless of which school financing system
is adopted to satisfy Serrano.
A.

Statewide Property Tax

Neither the Serrano decision nor subsequent decisions in other jurisdictions prohibit the use of the property tax as a revenue source for
schools. However, the decisions do require that if property taxes are
used as a revenue source, the tax effort in proportion to revenue must
be distributed equitably.4 6 This requirement, of course, holds true for
all revenue sources. Equalization of the property tax effort can be ac44. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, FIscAL REvIEw AND ANALYsIS OF SELECTED
CATFGoRICAL AID EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN CALIFORIA 7-13 (1971).
45. Id.
46. See note 31 supra.
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complished through district reorganization, adoption of a statewide
property tax, or adoption of a power-equalizing tax approach. For a
number of years the Legislative Analyst has recommended that the
California Legislature adopt a statewide property tax to achieve an
equitable distribution of the property tax burden. Revenue from a
statewide property tax could be distributed equally on a per pupil basis
throughout the state regardless of the assessed valuation per pupil of
any given school district.
A number of problems would have to be considered in moving to a
statewide property tax. One administrative problem which would
have to be resolved is the lack of uniformity in local assessment practices. In California, assessment ratios among counties vary widely according to the type of property assessed.47 If these variations are not
reduced, a statewide property tax for schools could have many inequities. One way to improve assessment practices would be for the state
to absorb the local assessment function and replace locally elected assessors with professionals.
The statewide property tax is often espoused as a means of providing
school district tax relief. However, if it were decided to provide tax
relief for schools by means of a statewide property tax, care would be
necessary to insure that a reduction in school property tax rates would
not result in increased property tax rates for other governmental purposes. Thus, if property tax relief is a goal, limits must be placed on
the use of property taxes in general.
B. Divided Tax Roll for Property Tax
An alternative to a statewide tax on all property (and a means to
provide property tax relief for homeowners) would be the splitting of
the property assessment role between residential and nonresidential
property. Under such a system, a statewide tax to fund a basic educational program could be levied on nonresidential property. Districts
wishing to exceed basic program expenditures could be given authority
to raise the necessary additional revenue by levying a tax on their residential property under a power-equalizing schedule. 48 The advantage
of a split roll system is that it neutralizes differences in property tax
rates as a factor in the location of business, thereby giving greater
weight to valid regional costs or market factors. The differential tax
rates permitted homeowners would reflect differing evaluations on their
part as to what should be spent for schools in their communities. Since
47.

CALFoRNjA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ANNUAL RFPORT

A-13 (1971).
48. See text accompanying note 32 supra.

1970-1971, at
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homeowners in a large measure represent parents of school children,
such variable levels would reflect local options consistent with the concept of local school district administration and policymaking. However, because Section 1 of Article XIII of the California Constitution
specifies that all property must be taxed at the same rate, it would
require a constitutional amendment to implement a split roll funding
system for schools in California.
Necessary Considerations for Alternative State School Revenue
Sources
It seems clear that any revised system for financing schools should
consider the need to improve the overall relationship of the total state
and local tax burden. This means that in seeking new revenue for
schools or replacement revenue to provide property tax relief, the Legislature should examine all revenue sources including personal income,
corporate franchise, sales and other taxes.
Three major factors should be considered in evaluating alternative
revenue sources for schools. The first factor is the rate of growth of
the revenue source. It would be desirable if the additional revenue
sources for schools were capable of growing at least as rapidly as the
increase in school costs. For example, the current cost of education
in California has grown at an average annual rate of 8.9 percent in
recent years.4 9 Thus, the income tax as a major source of revenue for
schools has an advantage over the sales tax because it grows at an annual rate of 12.2 percent while the sales tax only grows at a rate of
6.1 percent."
The second factor which should be considered is the impact of tax
shifts on particular segments of the economy. The adoption of alternative revenue sources should not produce major tax advantages to any
one segment of the economy. For example, in California a major
shift from property taxes to sales taxes would result in a substantial
tax shift from business to other taxpayers because the business segment
directly pays approximately 75 percent of total property taxes but only
25 percent of sales taxes. 5 '
The third factor which should be considered is the existing and future needs of state programs other than public elementary and secondary education. A search for alternative school revenue sources should
49. CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS
SELEC TED STATISTICS, 1970-71, at 77 (1972).
50. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, LOCAL PROPERTY TAX DATA 8 (1972) (on
file at the Office of the California Legislative Analyst, Sacramento, California).
51. Id. at 34.
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not result in an over-commitment of any particular revenue sources for
education at the expense of other state program needs. For example,
it is often suggested that the property tax should be totally replaced as
a revenue source for public schools. Although the property tax could
be supplemented with other revenue sources, it is extremely doubtful
that it would be possible to eliminate entirely the property tax as a
source of school revenue. The property tax in California produced
approximately 3.3 billion dollars in school revenue in 1971-72.52 Its
elimination would require substantial increases in other taxes which
could prove to be as unpopular as the current tax system.
Programs such as welfare, higher education, recreation, and others
can be expected to place strong financial demands on the state in the
future. As a result, the state should leave some flexibility in its revenue structure in order to meet reasonable predictions of these needs.
Thus, California should not utilize all of its most productive and elastic revenue sources to provide school property tax relief at the present
time.
Proposals for school finance reform should also consider potential
federal action. A recent report by the President's Commission on
School Finance recommended that the states assume the full cost of
public education over a five-year period.53 The commission recommended federal incentive payments to the states to accomplish the goal
of statewide funding. This report did not recommend the replacement
of local property tax revenues with federal funds. However, the President has indicated interest in a federal value-added tax as a means of
raising revenue to replace residential property taxes.
Conclusion
Serrano v. Priest and subsequent decisions have not spelled out specific alternatives to existing school finance systems. However, the general standard set by Serrano and other decisions is clear-education
may not be a function of wealth of any particular school district.54
52. Id. at 5.
53. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE, SCHOOLS, PEOPLE, AND MONEY,
THE NEED FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM, FINAL REPORT 26-37 (1972).
54. The Supreme Court of California stated in Serrano, "We have determined
that this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes
the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors." 5 Cal. 3d at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
In Texas it was held that "[the selection [of a new form of financing] may be made
from a wide variety of financing plans so long as the program adopted does not make
the quality of public education a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state
as a whole." Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp.
280, 285 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
The Minnesota court in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield held that "the level of spending for
a child's education may not be a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state
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Although numerous administrative, fiscal and political problems will
have to be resolved to arrive at compliance with this standard, such
compliance is essential.
At this time, Serrano and subsequent court rulings may appear to
have raised many more issues than they have resolved. However, the
court is to be commended for acting on the school finance problem despite the complexity of the issues involved. The court's approach to
the issue in Serrano has given the Legislature the opportunity to choose
among a number of alternative approaches to school finance reform.
The decision has imposed upon the Legislature a need to act, yet has
left it the freedom to select what it deems to be the most appropriate
and efficient alternative.
In the months since the court made its decision, the Legislature has
framed a number of alternative approaches, some of which would appear to comply with the principles of Serrano v. Priest, while others
would only move toward compliance with Serrano. The Legislature
has also drafted a number of the tax changes needed for financing a
practical solution to the problem of funding a foundation level of expenditure. These changes do not substantially curtail programs presently in operation in districts which spend a high amount per pupil.55
The most significant 1972 legislation passed in this area was S.B. 90.56
While most of the school reform proposals are generally coupled
with other property tax relief proposals, there are serious difficulties in
arriving at a political agreement on specific programs of property tax
relief because: (1) the tax increases needed for replacement revenues
raise issues associated with shifting the burden from one group of taxpayers to another; (2) the desire of political conservatives to impose
limits on future local property tax rate increases in order to secure lasting property tax reductions runs counter to the need for additional
revenue at the county level for support of other growing county costs,
such as welfare and public health; and (3) there is not one, but a number of methods for achieving property tax relief, each of which has a
somewhat different political and economic effect.
A case in point is welfare, where the program is controlled by both
federal and state laws, rules and regulations. A state administered
welfare system would save millions of dollars in administrative costs
as a whole." 334 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D. Minn. 1971).
55. Major finance and revenue bills considered but not passed by the Legislature
in 1972 included A.B. 1000 and A.B. 1283, 1972 Regular Session.
56. While S.B. 90, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 1406, does provide for some equalizing,
it does not strictly comply with our interpretation of Serrano because significant discrepancies will continue to exist among school districts in terms of tax rates and per
pupil expenditures.
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and would provide tax relief to urban areas, whereas the school finance
reform called for by Serrano v. Priest would largely benefit relatively
wealthy suburban citizens. Since there is a lack of uniformity in local
tax support for welfare similar to that which characterizes school support, the tax relief afforded by state assumption of the local property
tax burden imposed by the welfare program would effectively complement the relief afforded by reform of school support. By thus removing the welfare program entirely from the local taxpayer, the problems
associated with artificial control over local tax rates and expenditures
would be avoided.
In the last analysis the Legislature cannot expect to solve the property tax problems of local government solely by conforming to the Serrano v. Priest decision. While school finance reform would constitute a
major step toward solving the property tax problem, taxing inequities
would remain in other areas (such as welfare and public health)
which also are financed heavily from local property taxes. Until a
substantially increased share of the cost of these programs is assumed
by the state, either by direct program takeover or by property tax reimbursement, there will remain great pressure to restructure the basis of
support for these programs to remove property tax inequities.
Thus, unless the state acts to remove the overall property tax burden, or redesigns the funding of individual programs to eliminate the
uneven effect upon taxpayers, it may be anticipated that courts will
be petitioned to resolve the funding of other social services for reasons
which bear a close resemblance to those which led to Serranov. Priest.

